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ADMINISTRATIVE-LAW-LIKE OBLIGATIONS
ON PRIVATE[IZED] ENTITIES

Jack M. Beermann*
Privatization is often promoted as a cure for many of the problems of
government. In this Article, Professor Beermann argues that the effect of privatization is likely to be muted by the fact that several related phenomena have, in
recent years, reduced the differences between government and the private sector,
especially when privatization is involved. First, private entities are often compelled to make public or provide to government a great deal of information about
themselves, much as the Freedom of Information Act and related statutes require transparency in government. Second, discovery in litigation subjects a
great deal of private information to disclosure, a fact that has become more
important in recent years as the bases of potential liability have increased.
Third, the amount of regulation of private entities has increased markedly,
which subjects a great deal of previously private activity to government scrutiny
and examination in litigation. Fourth, regulation is often enhanced when privatization is involved. Privatization and deregulation usually come with strings
attached under which private entities are required to comply with governmentally prescribed standards of various forms and degrees of stringency. The lesson Professor Beermann urges to be drawn from these factors is that absent
significant across-the-boardderegulation, privatization is unlikely to achieve the
significant effects promised by its advocates.
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INTRODUCTION

Government provision and procurement of goods and services1 are
plagued by many problems. Some of these problems are caused by the lack
of effective discipline on government agencies. Other problems arise from
the opposite problem, that government agencies function within a legal regime that is overly restrictive, rendering government unable to meet the
challenges of dynamic social needs. Privatization is often thought of as a
cure for many of the problems associated with government provision and
procurement of goods or services, both because private entities are freed
from restrictions placed only on government, and because private entities
are subject to market discipline, which makes them better able to respond to
changes in the social environment.
What may sometimes be overlooked is that many similar problems and
restrictions exist with respect to private entities, especially those performing
functions that were previously performed by government, which I call
"privatized." On the discipline side, many of the issues in corporate law and
organization, arising both out of the separation of ownership and control and
the problem of accurately gauging the efficiency of production within a large
firm, revolve around agency cost issues similar to those that affect government agencies. Government's extreme separation of ownership and control
combined with government's coercive power make it highly amenable to
corruption in the form of favoritism based on factors that agents should not
consider, such as political support and the potential for private gain by government officials (for example in post-government careers). Similar
problems also exist in private entities in which ownership and control are
fragmented. Restrictive regulation is also common in the private and privatized sectors, and there are strong parallels between the regulation of private
entities and the regulatory environment within which government agencies
operate.
This Article examines two related phenomena relevant to privatization,
both of which tend to reduce the differences between the public and private
sectors. Taken together, these phenomena mean that privatization is unlikely to be more than a palliative in terms of solving the problems it is often
1.
By "goods and services" I mean both goods and services that are commonly available
from both governmental and private sources, such as recreation, housing, education, energy, and
transportation, and also goods and services that, while not exclusively governmental, are more
commonly considered governmental functions, such as regulation, regulatory enforcement, police
protection, highway layout, and traffic regulation. The category of "pure" or exclusive government
activity may actually be quite small, because private analogs can usually be found to government
activity. Privatization, on the other hand, is much more common in areas in which the particular
goods or services have always been commonly available from both governmental and private

sources.
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aimed at addressing, unless it is accompanied by significant across-the-board
deregulation. The first phenomenon is that the law places administrativelaw-like obligations on private and privatized entities, perhaps as a mechanism for maintaining political accountability over private sector activities
that are related to government.
The second phenomenon is that privatization often involves enhanced
regulation of the private or privatized entities that perform what were or
might have been government functions. While it is obvious that many
forms of privatization shield formerly public activities from at least some
measure of political supervision, in an earlier article2 I observed that some
forms of privatization may actually enhance political accountability. Among
the several ways in which accountability can be enhanced or at least preserved in privatization is that privatized entities are likely to be subject to a
great deal of government supervision in terms of monitoring the private entities for observance of performance standards of various degrees of strictness.
In some situations, there may be increased suspicion in privatization, and
monitoring may actually increase despite the usual existence of superior
mechanisms for monitoring the behavior of government entities.
While all private entities are subject to an enormous level of scrutiny in
the contemporary administrative state, privatization is likely to entail increased regulation and scrutiny of privatized entities. While the degree of
supervision may be less with some privatized entities than if or when the
entity was part of government, in many areas it is likely to be substantial.
This observation should not be surprising because there must have been
some perceived public policy basis or politically powerful constituency behind the level of government control that existed prior to privatization. It
would be more surprising if an entity or function suddenly went from government ownership or control to complete deregulation. Boiled down to
their essentials, both points mean that absent a significant movement toward deregulation, legal and therefore political control is likely to remain
extensive with regard to private and privatized institutions.
This Article elaborates these points as follows. In Part I, I compare the
regulation of private entities to administrative law and other norms that
traditionally are thought of as applying to the public sector. In the course of
this comparison, I look more specifically at the availability of information in
both the public and private sectors, at the way that the review of corporate
management resembles judicial review of administrative agency action and
at the mechanisms employed for monitoring privatized institutions generally.
In Part II, I illustrate the way in which regulation of privatized entities is
2. See Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1507, 1507-57 (2001).
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enhanced through the example of the application of antidiscrimination
norms in privatization. In Part III, I consider why the phenomena addressed
by this Article occur, that is, why it is that privatization so often involves
increased government regulation and scrutiny of the private actors involved
in privatization.
Some may take my argument-that privatization is unlikely to result in
significant social change unless accompanied by massive deregulation-as an
argument against privatization on the basis that given this understanding, it
is not worth taking the trouble to privatize. Others who see great potential
in privatization might view this reality as an argument in favor of deregulation so the potential of privatization can be realized. I do not mean to take
sides on this matter. Rather, I point out the effect and conclude that some
privatization measures might be worth taking anyway.
I.

THE ANALOGY BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE ENTITIES

At the outset, it is important to consider the analogy between administrative law and the regulation of private entities. Gerald Frug's 1984 article
The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 3 explored the commonalities
between corporate law and administrative law in great detail, from the point
of view of how bureaucracy affects life and law and how discretion within
bureaucracy is controlled. Frug stressed the similarities of the various normative bases for legal acceptance of the bureaucratic, hierarchical form of
social organization embodied in the administrative agency and the corporation, and then rejected each one of them as insufficient to justify the
nondemocratic forms of social organization they represent. 4
The importance of Frug's article for present purposes is its recognition
that private law and administrative law present similar issues regarding controlling and channeling the behavior of fiduciaries, agents who are supposed
to be acting on behalf of a principal or principals. The parallels between the
public and private sectors extend beyond corporate and administrative law
and even beyond the boundaries of what is conceived of as a fiduciary relationship. There are many areas in which the law regulates a person or entity's conduct because the subject of the regulation's power implicates the
interests of third parties in situations not evidencing the traditional indicia
of a fiduciary relationship. For example, many tort claims and civil rights
actions arise in nonfiduciary settings.
3.
(1984).
4.

Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1276
See id. at 1286-97.

Administrative-Law-Like Obligations

1721

The desirability of the degree of regulation of everyday private activity
that exists in contemporary society is often a source of disagreement. I hope
it is safe to say that regardless of one's perspective on the normative question, as a positive matter there is a great deal of government regulation of
both economic and social activity in the private sector. Deregulation, in
fact, is often considered a category of privatization because its aim is to move
decisionmaking out of government and into the private sector, either by way
of the market in the case of economic activity, or by way of the individual,
the family, or other social units in the case of noneconomic activity. 5 There
is a great deal of regulation that would have to be eliminated to move from
the current situation to complete privatization.
Information in the Public and Private Sectors
One of the hallmarks of the public sector is the stress on transparency.
Especially since the open government movement of the last several decades,
the proceedings and records of government entities are presumed to be open
and available to the public. Most fundamentally, agencies must give advance notice when they are contemplating action that may affect members
of the public, either individually or collectively, and agency rules are not
binding unless they are published or the subject of the rule receives actual
notice. 6 Further, a related group of statutes guarantees open government,
including the Government in the Sunshine Act 7 and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 8 The Government in the Sunshine Act requires, subject to certain exceptions, that meetings of multimember agencies be open
to the public. FOIA makes agency records, again subject to enumerated exceptions, open to public inspection and copying.
In conceptualizing the differences between the public and private sectors, it is tempting to point to the stress on transparency in the public sector
as distinguishing it from the private sector. However, the private sector is
not as private as one might think, or at least as it might once have been.
While meetings of corporate directors are not required to be open to the
public, securities laws and the general functioning of capital markets place a
great deal of information about private corporations in the public domain.
With regard to publicly traded corporations, it is not hyperbole to state that
nearly as much information about them is easily accessible to the public as is

A.

5. See Beermann, supra note 2, at 1528-41; Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law and
Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 459-60 (1988).
6. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-553 (2000). For convenience, this discussion focuses on federal
law, although state law in most if not all states contains similar requirements.
7. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-553, 556-557, 39

U.S.C. § 410).
8.

5 U.S.C. §552(a)-(g) (2000).
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available about the workings of many administrative agencies. The steady
flow of Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, the market's demand
for information when earnings or other major items are reported, and the
structure of corporate governance all contribute to the widespread availability of information.
Publicly traded corporations cannot make major decisions out of the
public eye. Rather, in the many areas in which shareholder approval is required, even if shareholders rarely dissent, the formality of a shareholder
vote means that proposals and supporting materials become matters of public
record for all to see. In the rare case of a real debate over the direction a
private corporation should take, a proxy fight places even more information
about the inner workings and prospects of the company in the public view.
There are other sorts of private entities that find it impossible to keep
their information private as well. The investment industry is subject to disclosure requirements that result in the production of massive amounts of
information. Even absent legal requirements, prudent investors would demand disclosure of a great deal of information. Insurance companies likewise must disclose information to gain the confidence of their customers,
especially in areas such as life insurance, in which customers are almost as
interested in the long-term well-being of the company as in their own longterm health. State 9 and federallo regulation of charitable corporations results
in extensive government supervision of the activities of nonprofit corporations and, in some circumstances, public access to information concerning
nonprofit groups.1

9.

States typically regulate the governance and activities of charitable corporations and

trusts:

In most states, the attorney general has responsibility for overseeing and supervising charitable corporations and trusts .... State attorneys general can bring civil actions to remove
directors and officers for self-dealing, waste, diversion of a charitable organization's assets, or
other breach of fiduciary duty. They can also attempt to cause an accounting by a nonprofit
organization of its assets or to dissolve a charitable corporation for ultra vires acts. However,
they do not have the power to manage the daily affairs of a charitable organization.
Nina J. Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet on the "Home Front" for CharitableOrganizations, 29 N.M. L.
REv. 1, 2 n.3 (1999) (citations omitted).
10. Nonprofit corporations must meet detailed statutory and regulatory standards to retain
their tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); 26 C.F.R.
§ 1-501(c)(3) (2001).
11.
An interesting example of government regulation of the activities of charitable organizations is the Massachusetts Attorney General's intervention in the sale of the Boston Red Sox
baseball team. A large share of the Red Sox was owned by a charitable trust and, under threat of
litigation, the Massachusetts Attorney General forced the parties to the transaction to increase the
amount that would be realized by the beneficiaries of the trust before he would approve the sale.
See Meg Vaillancourt & Gordon Edes, Baseball Ok's Red Sox Sale: Henry Gets Team After Charities'
Funding Boosted, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 2002, at Al.
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There are many industries that are so heavily regulated that vital information concerning their products and services is subject to disclosure to the
government, and sometimes to the public generally. Food and drug manufacturers are obvious examples of entities that cannot keep the ingredients of
their products secret.' 2 Pesticide manufacturers must disclose their formulae
to the government, and they cannot even prevent their competitors from
using that information to develop and win regulatory approval for competing
products.13 While the internal operations of private companies are not generally open to the public, the amount of information in the public domain
concerning private entities is staggering. The private sector is far from
private.
In fact, even those areas in which records are private, in the sense that
they are in the possession of private entities with no general obligation to
make records public, there are many situations in which ostensibly private
material may become public. When litigation occurs, for example, liberal
discovery rules can function like a more focused version of FOIA, opening a
great deal of private information to access by opponents in civil actions,
which in turn may lead to public disclosure of that information. In fact,
discovery is not limited to the parties of a particular action, but rather may
be utilized against nonparties who have information relevant to the litiga5
tion. 14 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' on discovery make available
"any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
6 While this
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things.'
may be narrower than the previous version of the rule, which allowed discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter

See generally The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301-399 (2000).
12.
See generally The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136
13.
(2000). Under § 136h(d), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must disclose all health,
safety, and environmental data regarding registered pesticides to certain competitors who might use
the information to support registering a competing pesticide. The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that the original registrant may not enjoin disclosure of any trade secrets, but that compensation
must be provided under the Takings Clause. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1016-19 (1984). In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582-94
(1985), the Supreme Court upheld a compensation system under which the subsequent user of any
information disclosed is required to negotiate with the original registrant over the value of the
information, subject to binding arbitration if the negotiations fail. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii) (2000).
A nonparty must be served with a subpoena in order to be compelled to submit to dis14.
covery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c).
Again for convenience, I focus on federal law. State rules of civil procedure tend to be
15.
similar to federal rules.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
16.
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involved in the pending action,"' 17 it still allows for broad access to the
records of private entities involved in federal court litigation.
Both discovery and FOIA have exceptions that can protect material
from disclosure. Privileges can exempt some material from discovery. Further, discovery may be conducted subject to a protective order that precludes
disclosure of material beyond the parties, and sensitive material can be redacted before matter is turned over to the other party. FOIA has similar
provisions. Both are subject to exceptions and adjustments in order to meet
legitimate claims for nondisclosure. Both systems, however, illustrate my
point that a designation of information as "private" is far from absolute.
FOJA and discovery share an interesting similarity in that the scope of
each is affected greatly by the degree of regulation. The more regulation
there is, the more records agencies will create, and thus the more material
will be subject to FOIA disclosure. This is also true of discovery. The range
of conduct that can give rise to a meritorious civil action has increased
greatly in recent decades. This means that more and more private conduct
is subject to judicial scrutiny, and therefore more and more private information is subject to disclosure through discovery. The combination of extensive administrative regulation and broad civil liability makes private entities'
personnel practices, manufacturing methods, disciplinary policies in educational institutions, and even the reasons for the temperature of coffee served
in a private restaurant potentially subject to public disclosure as embodied in
an agency record or in a response to discovery.
B. Review of Corporate Management
With regard to corporations, litigation may add substantially to the
ability of the public to obtain information about corporations, and to the
ability of the law to supervise corporate decisionmaking. Shareholders upset
with corporate losses can obtain judicial review of corporate decisions under
the business judgment rule. While such review is probably more deferential
than most judicial review of agency action, there are parallels between review of business judgment and review of agency action.
A leading treatise on the business judgment rule details the elements of
the rule as a business decision made by disinterested, independent directors
exercising due care and acting in good faith and absent an abuse of discretion.' 8 These elements of the business judgment rule for present purposes
constitute a somewhat more deferential version of the U.S. Supreme Court's
elaboration of the standard of review of agency action, the "arbitrary and
17.

FED.

18.

See

R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (1999) (repealed 2000).
DENNIS

J.BLOCK

CORPORATE DIIECTORS

ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF

39-89 (5th ed. 1998).
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capricious" standard, which requires consideration of "relevant factors" and
no "clear error in judgment."1 9
"Due care" under the business judgment rule is not the "reasonable person" standard of negligence commonly used in tort litigation; rather it requires that corporate decisionmakers be "reasonably informed" before
making a decision. 0 This is similar to the administrative law requirement
that all relevant factors be considered: A decisionmaker is not reasonably
informed if he or she is unaware of relevant factors. The business judgment
rule's good faith element is violated by "conscious doing of a wrong because
of dishonest purpose."'" However, it has also been stated that "[b]ad faith
may be inferred where 'the decision is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable
judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than
bad faith."'", This bears some resemblance to the Supreme Court's statement that an agency decision may be arbitrary or capricious when it is "so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. '2 3 The abuse-of-discretion element of the business
judgment rule even more directly parallels judicial review of agency action,
by allowing courts to engage in their own analysis of the reasonableness of a
business judgment to ensure that directors have not abused their discretion. 24 This is very similar to the "no clear error in judgment" standard applied by courts reviewing agency decisions.
Another interesting parallel between judicial review under corporate
law and under administrative law exists with regard to the presumption that
2
an agency's decision not to seek enforcement is unreviewable. The business judgment rule is at its most deferential in shareholder derivative litigation, in which a shareholder sues to compel the corporation to assert claims
the corporation may have against a third party, which the corporation has
chosen not to assert. In both situations, the limits on judicial review may be
overcome. On the corporate side, the litigation will go forward if the disinterested directors are unable to articulate a rational basis for the corporation's refusal to assert the claim.2 6 On the administrative side, the
19. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43
(1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
20. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 18, at 74.
Id. at 80 (quoting Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II,
21.
L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1208 n.16 (Del. 1993) (internal quotes omitted)).
22. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 18, at 82 (quoting In Re. J.P. Stevens & Co. S'holders Litig.,
542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43.
23.
24. The abuse-of-discretion element has apparently not been adopted by the key state of
Delaware. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 18, at 85-86.
25. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
26. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 18, at 1702-44 (discussing various standards of judicial
review of the decision to terminate derivative litigation).
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presumption against review of an agency's decision not to bring an enforcement action can be rebutted if a statute or rule articulates mandatory standards for agency enforcement.27 The decision is then reviewable for
compliance with the applicable standards under the arbitrary or capricious
standard.
Although judicial scrutiny of agency decisions is perhaps more stringent, courts perform a similar analysis when reviewing corporate decisions.
Just as courts scrutinize and sometimes set aside agency action for going beyond the bounds of law or reason, so too can courts, at the instance of disappointed shareholders, set aside the action of corporate managers for acting
beyond the bounds of their power or contrary to all reason.
C.

Privatization and Public Monitoring of Institutions
Privatization of important government functions is likely to entail extensive public monitoring of the private institutions involved.
The following part's discussion of antidiscrimination norms2 8 that were
applied first to government contractors illustrates that government scrutiny
of entities involved in privatization is likely to be extensive. Private entities
taking over government institutions, such as private prison operators, private
companies hired to run public schools, and private companies operating social services agencies, are likely to be subject to the greatest scrutiny, but
even companies providing goods and services to the government in "contracting out" forms of privatization are likely to be more heavily regulated
than other private businesses.
To get a sense of the way in which government regulates private entities, I looked at Tennessee's and Texas's statutes regarding private prisons.
While my sample is not scientific and therefore only anecdotal, I have no
reason to believe that scientific study would undermine the representative
nature of the two states I studied. Further, while prisons are likely to be
more heavily regulated than other privatized entities, it remains worthwhile
to look at this form of privatization as a highly visible example of what is
likely to be a general tendency. In Tennessee and Texas, private prisons are
subject to a very high level of scrutiny. 9 A state bureaucracy monitors the
performance of private prisons and the private prison operators are expected
to operate within parameters established by the state. In Tennessee, reports
to a legislative committee are required, and if that committee determines
that the prison is not performing up to state standards, the contract may not
27.
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833-35 (discussing Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975)).
28. See infra Part II.
29. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 41-24-101 to 24-115 (1997); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.
§§ 495.001-008 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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be renewed.30 Also in Tennessee, private prison contractors must provide
audited financial statements to be eligible to enter into a contract with the
state, and the contractor must purchase insurance pursuant to a state standard. Further, in both states, the contractor is statutorily precluded from
raising the defense of sovereign immunity in defense of any suit arising out of
31
the operation of a private prison.

Insofar as liability is a form of monitoring, privatization may not eliminate government-like style liability and may, in fact, enhance it. In numerous cases, private parties have been held to be state actors subject to
constitutional constraints when they conspire with or otherwise act in concert with state officials. 32 Privatization of some state institutions may result
in "state actor" treatment for the operators of the privatized facility. The
best example of this is the prison context, in which prisoners in state custody
are actually housed in privately owned facilities under contract with the
state. Although the Supreme Court has not decided this precise issue, it is
very likely that private prisons will be held to be state actors for the purposes
of litigation over conditions of confinement, including claims of unconstitutionally excessive force by prison guards.
Although private persons may be considered state actors for the purposes of constitutional tort litigation, they are not treated as state actors for
all purposes. In fact, in one respect, the Court has made the operators of
private prisons, and by analogy other private institutions in privatization
contexts, somewhat worse off than their governmental counterparts. In line
with its prior refusal to grant immunities to private actors sued for civil rights
violations, 33 the Court held that private prison guards do not have the quali34
fied immunity from damages that state-employed guards enjoy. Under the

immunity, state officials such as prison guards cannot be sued for damages
unless their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of
which a reasonable official should have known. 35 Guards in private prisons
are subject to damages liability even for newly recognized rights. This means
that in this particular privatization context, and perhaps in analogous situations, public law obligations are enforced more strenuously on the private
actors in a privatized institution than on their public official counterparts.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-105 (1997); see also TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 495.008
30.
(Vernon Supp. 2002) (requiring the Department of Corrections to audit and monitor the performance of private prison contractors).
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-107(b) (1997); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 495.005
31.
(Vernon 1998).
See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).
32.
See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1992).
33.
34. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997).
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
35.
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The private prison example also illustrates another feature in the application of public law rules in the privatization context-administrative-lawlike and other public law obligations apply only selectively in the privatization context. While constitutional restrictions such as the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment may apply to the privatized
institution, private prisons are unlikely to be subject to civil service rules
regarding their employment practices, and a corporation that owns private
prisons is not likely to be subject to open records and to open meetings
requirements. On the other hand, there is no doubt that private prison operators are subject to a great deal of government oversight to ensure that
they operate according to the conditions imposed in contracts with the government, and the extensive government regulation of private entities discussed elsewhere in this Article will apply with full force.
The charter school movement also helps illustrate that privatization
often comes with increased monitoring. Charter schools are sometimes
characterized as a form of privatization, although they are actually better
conceptualized as government reform. In Massachusetts, and I suspect in
many other states, charter schools are not private but are actually alternative
public schools, taken out of the local school board structure, but supported
by public funds and required to follow a strict state-mandated structure.
Charter schools are thus distinct from tuition voucher programs through
which parents can send their children to private schools. The only similarity between charter schools and a voucher system is that the traditional public schools are forced to compete for students and public funds that are often
based, at least in part, on enrollment. Charter schools are an attempt to
introduce this competition without privatizing.
In fact, charter schools may actually be more heavily regulated in some
respects than traditional public schools in that they can be abolished for
failing to meet performance standards much more easily than traditional
public schools. In Massachusetts, there is at least one recent case of a charter school not getting a renewal of its charter for failing to meet state performance and other regulatory standards.36 The board of directors of a
charter school may be more private than the elected or appointed school
boards that are in charge of traditional public schools, but the composition
of the board may be heavily regulated. Another difference between the
charter school board and a traditional school board is that the charter school
board is unlikely to have a political constituency akin to that of a traditional
public school board. Because charter schools are chartered by the state, regulation of them is more centralized, with supervision at the state level rather
36. See Ed Hayward, Ed Board Dissolves Lynn Charter School, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 27,
2002, at 14.
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than the local level. In fact, the charter school movement could be viewed
partially as a move by state education regulators to gain some control away
from local school boards.

II.

REGULATION IN PRIVATIZATIONANTIDISCRIMINATION NORMS

As part of privatization, private businesses performing what previously
were government functions may find themselves subject to legal norms more
stringent than those applicable to the private sector generally. Government
may view these businesses as extensions of government when they are performing what were government functions. Further, even if government does
recognize the public/private distinction, it may not be respected. Government may wish to retain a strong measure of political accountability over the
activities of the private entities it deals with. Further, it may appear illegitimate to avoid governmental obligations by simply privatizing an area. For
these and probably additional reasons, privatization is likely to come with
strings attached.
A.

Business Affected with the Public Interest

The best historical example of this phenomenon is in the area of antidiscrimination norms. Once upon a time, the strongest antidiscrimination
norms in our legal system applied to privately owned businesses that were in
a special category of businesses "affected with the public interest." These
businesses, such as inns and common carriers, were deprived of one of the
central elements of freedom of contract, the right to refuse to enter into a
contract with a prospective customer. Rather, these businesses were required to accept all customers on an equal basis. For example, anyone arriving at an inn and willing to pay the posted rate was entitled to a room, and
anyone wishing to ship goods on the conveyance of a common carrier and
37
willing to pay the posted rate was entitled to do so. Other businesses, by
contrast, were allowed to discriminate among potential customers on any
basis they chose. Further, there was no general prohibition on employment
discrimination. The narrowness of the exception to the usual norms of free
contract is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that it did not extend even to
the practice of medicine. A doctor was free to refuse service to a dying
patient, even within a legal regime that required inns and common carriers
to accept all prospective customers, and even though doctors were licensed
37. See generally Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1401-08 (1996). Singer argues that the duty to refrain from
discrimination extended beyond the narrow category traditionally identified as "affected with the
public interest." Id. at 1400 (citation omitted).
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by the state. 38 The theory underlying this branch of the law was that businesses affected with the public interest were analogous to state actors. 39
B. Antidiscrimination Norms and Government Contractors
The norm of equal employment opportunity in private employment
made its first significant legal inroad through its application to the "contracting out" privatization vehicle. Since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a strong antidiscrimination norm has applied to government. 40
However, the Supreme Court resisted applying that norm to private businesses, even businesses "affected with a public interest." 4' Developments
highly relevant to privatization, beginning during the Second World War,
provoked the wider application of antidiscrimination norms in the private
sector. In 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt issued an executive order banning discrimination in "defense industries" and "government" based on
"race, creed, color or national origin." 42 Then, in 1943, President Roosevelt
extended the antidiscrimination provision to all government contractors, effectively extending the government's obligation not to discriminate to the
vast area of the economy doing business with the federal government. 43
From the standpoint of privatization, the importance of President
Roosevelt's executive orders, and those of his successors, is clear. It is a
measure of the strength of the norm against discrimination by government
that government reached out to prohibit those with whom it did business
from discriminating. In light of this understanding, privatization is unlikely
to provide a method for escaping the reach of important norms that constrain government more than the private sector generally.
After Roosevelt's series of orders, president after president issued executive orders restating and expanding the obligation of government contractors to refrain from discrimination. Obligations were increased and
enforcement was enhanced. Phrases such as "equal employment opportunity" and "affirmative action" first made their way into the legal vernacular
as part of presidential orders directed at government contractors. 44 President
38.
See Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 417 (1901) (explicitly contrasting doctors, who
have no duty to serve the public, with "innkeepers, common carriers, and the like").
39.
For an interesting discussion of this, see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 37-43
(1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
41.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 37-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that businesses
covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were of a public nature and that the U.S. Congress thus
had power to reach them in legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment).
42.
Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943).
43.
See Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943).
44.
See Michael H. LeRoy, Presidential Regulation of Private Employment: Constitutionality of
Executive Order 12,954 Debarment of Contractors Who Hire Permanent Striker Replacements, 37 B.C.
L. REV. 229, 256, 258-59 (1996).
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John F. Kennedy's order, the last issued before the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, proclaimed that "discrimination because of race, creed,
color, or national origin is contrary to the Constitutional principles and policies of the United States."45 Given that the U.S. Congress had not yet
enacted legislation banning such discrimination in private employment,
President Kennedy's statement was forward-looking. Imposing antidiscrimination norms on private government contractors proved to be a convenient device to help move practices in the direction favored by President
Kennedy and his administration.
C.

Antidiscrimination Law in the Private Sector

The executive orders discussed above became somewhat less important
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which together with state
law counterparts, prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender, and national origin in virtually all private employment in the United
States. However, government contractors are still subject to enhanced reporting requirements, and the technique of expanding legal obligations on
private companies based on their status as government contractors has not
been lost on subsequent administrations. More recently, President Bill Clinton, in Executive Order Number 12,954, prohibited government contractors
from hiring permanent replacements for striking workers. 46 Labor laws applicable to most private employers allow the hiring of permanent replacements for many strikers, and in light of this, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit held that President Clinton's order was preempted by the
National Labor Relations Act.47 While President Clinton's attempt failed, it
is likely that government will continue to use the privatization connection
to extend government regulation.
The expansion of antidiscrimination norms as applied to private employers, private businesses, and other entities has greatly deprivatized large
areas of society. The membership practices of large membership organizations are subject to government scrutiny, 48 as are the admissions practices of
schools and universities. 49 Another important development is the expansion
of the prohibited bases of discrimination. In addition to race, gender, religion, and national origin, various laws now attack discrimination based on
age, disability, pregnancy, and marital status, to name a few. Government
45. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963).
46. See Exec. Order No. 12,954, 3 C.F.R. 329 (1995).
47. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332-39 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
48. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984).
49. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596-99 (1983); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172-79 (1976).
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scrutiny of employment and other business practices has expanded greatly in
recent decades.
While the reach of antidiscrimination law began with a core of standards applicable to government and government contractors, recent Supreme Court decisions have made it easier to enforce some of these norms
against private entities than against government. In a series of cases, the
Court has held that sovereign immunity limits Congress's power to enforce
antidiscrimination and other laws against state government in cases in
which the law at issue attacks forms of discrimination or other conduct without a strong Fourteenth Amendment pedigree. For example, the Court has
stated that states cannot be held liable in damages for discrimination based
on age or disability.50 The Court's decisions do not appear to affect the
enforceability of laws aimed at traditionally suspect classifications such as
race or sex, but they do limit the enforceability of bans on discrimination
based on nonsuspect classifications such as age or disability.
The Court has not stated that these laws are wholly without effect with
regard to state government discrimination. In its decision against state liability for damages based on disability discrimination, the Supreme Court
stated in a footnote that injunctions are still available against state violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act.51 At least one lower court has
accepted this dictum as authoritative and consistent with prior Supreme
Court decisions.52 In its decision denying Congress the power to make states
liable in money damages for age discrimination, the Court was silent on
whether injunctions were authorized, but the logic of its statement in the
disability case would seem to apply equally.
In my view, despite the Supreme Court's dictum, there is reason to
question whether injunctive suits forcing states to comply with federal laws
proscribing disability and age discrimination will survive. Because these
statutes are unauthorized by the Fourteenth Amendment, the question boils
down to whether Congress has the power to prescribe injunctive remedies
against states for violations of laws passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
The Court's dictum relies on Ex Parte Young,5 3 which authorizes injunctions
against state officials acting in their official capacity when they violate the
U.S. Constitution, on the theory that the state cannot authorize such viola50.
See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2000) (holding that
Congress lacks the power to provide for a damages remedy against a state or state agency for discrimination against handicapped individuals); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88-91
(2000) (holding that Congress lacks the power to provide for a damages remedy against a state or
state agency for age discrimination).
51.
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);
see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
52.
See Gibson v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 265 F.3d 718, 720 (8th Cit. 2001).
53.
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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tions.54 In effect, the injunction against the state official is an injunction
against the state, just not in name. In the course of an opinion denying
federal courts the power to issue injunctions against state officials based on
violations of state law, the Court stressed that "a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action is not one against the State.

55

Later in

the opinion, the Court referred more generally to violations of federal law as
the basis for an Ex Parte Young injunction, but the Court has not focused on
the precise issue of whether Ex Parte Young authorizes injunctions based on
nonconstitutional federal law. There is at least some suggestion in opinions
construing the doctrine that injunctions are justified only when founded
upon constitutional violations.
The irony here is that privatization may enhance the reach of the antidiscrimination norms that the Court has stated cannot be enforced against
state government. As a simple example, suppose a state university engages
in age discrimination in the hiring and firing of its employees by requiring
tenured professors to retire at the age of seventy. Although this practice is
clearly illegal, under the Supreme Court's decisions, a federal court cannot
issue a judgment for money damages against the university for this discrimination. If the university were privatized, however, the new private institution would be fully subject to federal age discrimination laws, and damages
would be available in a challenge to its discriminatory retirement policy.
This is contrary to the usual pattern in which antidiscrimination norms that
initially applied most strongly against government bleed over into the private sector.
The analysis above may overstate the importance of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions because federal law prohibiting race and gender discrimination is still fully operative against states and because state law also
limits the ability of state entities to discriminate on many of the bases attacked by federal law. The Supreme Court has referred to this latter fact in
its decisions limiting the reach of federal law.56 Nevertheless, state policy-

makers are free to impose norms that are less strict than federal law, and in
some areas, states may have powerful incentives to do so.
Thus, I find it very unlikely that many instances of privatization would
reduce the effectiveness of antidiscrimination norms. If anything, increased
sensitivity coupled with the enhanced amenability of private entities to
traditional legal remedies means that antidiscrimination norms will apply
more strongly after privatization than before. It seems to me unrealistic to
54. See id. at 155-56, 159.
55.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984).
56. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) ("State employees are protected
by state age discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from their state employers, in
almost every State of the Union." (footnote omitted)).
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imagine that a private party entering a government contract or assuming
what was previously a government function will be more able to discriminate
than the government entity itself.

ILL.

WHY?

Assume that I am correct that privatization is likely to be accompanied
by a great deal of regulation and scrutiny of the conduct of the private entities performing what had been government functions and even private entities in the contracting-out situation. Why is this so? In what follows, I

speculate about possible reasons for this phenomenon.
The fact that privatization is likely to be politically controversial means
that its effects are likely to be muted with close scrutiny of privatized entities
and strong demands for increased regulation or deprivatization if serious failures occur. Public employees, their unions, and other people who are generally supportive of government regulation will oppose privatization, as will
politicians who draw their support from such people and groups. The forces
in favor of privatization are unlikely to have the political power to ignore
completely the naysayers whose constituencies are suspicious of privatization. Whatever constituency supported the previous regulatory structure is
not going to be happy with an ineffective, poorly run program, whether the
entity running the program is public or private. Compromise in favor of
controlled privatization may result. For example, a private firm might operate a public school, but only if it complies with strict standards, it is constantly monitored, and the contract is easily terminable. Elected officials
may worry about the wrath of voters and other supporters if a privatized firm
turns out to have advanced its own interest in profits at the expense of the
public or the people the agency was supposed to serve, or if the privatized
firm turns out to be just plain incompetent.
Similar issues arise when one considers privatization of government
functions like bank deposit insurance or environmental protection. If the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), for example, were sold to a
private company, or if the insurance the FDIC provides were put out for
bids, it is likely that any private entity assuming this function would be held
to strict legal standards. Moreover, even if the FDIC were privatized, the
banks covered by the deposit insurance would likely remain subject to the
incredibly complicated capital and reporting requirements currently in existence. If FDIC insurance were eliminated and banks started to fail, there
would be a swift and powerful demand both for the government to provide
disaster relief for those affected by the failures and for government insurance
or some other form of regulation to be reinstituted. Likewise, if the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were privatized, and if pollution worsened,
demands for re-regulation would certainly follow in short order.
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There is a parallel here with the pervasive use of the spending power by
57
the federal government to impose performance standards on state agencies.
The federal government provides a great deal of funding for many matters of
local concern, including welfare, highway construction, and the operation of
educational institutions and prisons, to name a few. Just as the federal government attaches strings, in the form of federal standards, to the money it
provides to state and local governments, so too is government likely to attach strings to the government money that ends up in the hands of privatized entities. While there is some variation in the degree of federal
supervision of state programs supported by federal money, the federal government's reluctance to abandon supervision of state programs receiving federal funds is similar to the government's general reluctance to abandon close
regulation of private institutions involved in privatization.
In fact, unless an area is so thoroughly privatized and deregulated that
the program or activity is no longer associated with government at all, government is likely to remain very concerned with how the privatization is
working out. When government pays a private entity to carry out a government function, or awards a large contract to a private entity to supply goods
or services to or on behalf of government, it is natural to expect close supervision by government. An indictment of a private contractor for fraud, or
the removal of a private contractor for waste or mismanagement, is likely to
be accompanied by damage to or the end of careers in government. Government accountability remains, and with it government regulation.
That is not to say that all of the government supervision is genuine.
Government may be dominated by pro-privatization forces who favor strong
deregulation as part of an effective privatization program. The political environment may force these people to engage in supervision for show, with a
wink and a nod. In contracting-out situations, cozy relationships between
private contractors and the government agents charged with monitoring
them may help explain waste and mismanagement. Politicians may be able
to deceive their constituents into believing they are doing their best in supervising privatized entities when in actuality they are not.
The communications market provides a good example of how difficult
it is to determine whether government supervision of private entities is unUnder article I, section 8, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, referred to as the Spending
57.
Clause, Congress has the power to "provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. In exercising this power, Congress often allocates
money to state and local governments, subject to conditions with which recipients must comply in
order to obtain the funds. The Supreme Court has been fairly liberal in allowing Congress to
attach conditions to the receipt of federal funds. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
211-12 (1987) (approving a provision under which the U.S. Secretary of Transportation must
withhold a percentage of federal highway funds from states where the drinking age is less than
twenty-one).
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dertaken with the public interest in mind. Satisfaction seems to be very
high in two areas with the least regulation and most competition-long distance telephone service and internet service. Surprisingly, the Federal Communications Commission thought the best regulatory strategy in long
distance service would be to virtually eliminate for most carriers even the
most rudimentary form of regulation, tariff filing, but the Supreme Court
rebuffed this as inconsistent with the fundamentals of the applicable regulatory scheme.18 It should be noted that the positive developments in the long
distance area are due at least in part to careful regulatory structuring of what
has become a well-functioning market. In the more highly regulated cable
television arena, there seems to be greater consumer dissatisfaction, although
it is unclear whether the regulators are to blame. There are still regulations
such as must-carry rules for cable providers and restrictions on what satellite
providers may transmit that frustrate the ability of consumers to get what
they want. This example illustrates that once you have regulation, interest
group lobbying and rent extraction are sure to follow. 9 This illustrates what
I think is the real issue underlying a great deal of this discussion. Privatization is less likely to have a tremendously positive effect if it is carried out in
the context of a highly regulated society with big government taken for
granted as a feature of the society. The social effect of privatization is likely
to be muted unless accompanied by radically reduced regulation. So long as
big government is there to exercise coercive power, private entities will look
to government for results that they could not achieve in the private market,
and government will feel compelled by political reality to at least appear to
be closely monitoring the performance of private entities. For privatization
to entail really significant social change, it would have to be accompanied by
a higher degree of deregulation than has occurred up to now.
CONCLUSION

In theory, extensive privatization could lead to substantial social
changes in the form of greater private ordering. However, in the current
political climate, this seems unlikely. Rather, privatization is likely to be
accompanied by significant regulation in the form of performance standards,
58.
See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT & T, 512 U.S. 218, 229-34 (1994).
59.
For a fascinating example, consider Fred McChesney's examination of Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) regulation of the funeral industry. See generally Fred S. McChesney, Consumer
Ignorance and Consumer Protection Law: Empirical Evidence from the FTC Funeral Rule, 7 J.L. &
POL'Y 1 (1990). McChesney concludes that "cremators and other sellers not subject to the Rule"
benefited from the FTC's rule, not consumers. Id. at 4; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223 (1986); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-GroupOrganization in a Coasean
Model of Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1991); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent
Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
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monitoring by government and the imposition of norms not directly related
to the privatization. In fact, the generally higher regulatory burden felt by
all private entities today means that private firms generally may find themselves living in a much more restrictive regulatory environment than is implicit in the appellation "private." This is not to say that privatization isnot
worth the trouble. Privatization may result in significant cost reduction and
improved performance as compared to government agencies that lack a
strong incentive to perform well. However, the realities of our regulatory
structure should provide a cautionary tale against unrealistic expectations.

